Analizy metafizyczne: dualizm psychofizyczny - odmiany i argumentacje

(Metaphysical Analyses: Psychophysical Dualism – Its Versions and Arguments)

Seminarium w roku akad. 2018/2019

 

Literatura podstawowa:

 

1)          Zimmerman D.W. (2006), Dualism in the Philosophy of Mind, [in:] D. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, New York: Thompson Gale, 113–122.

2)          Goff Ph. (2014), The Cartesian Argument against Physicalism, [in:] M. Sprevak, J. Kallestrup (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 3–20.

3)          Meixner, U. (2004), The Neo-Cartesian Argument for Substance Dualism, [in:] U. Meixner, The Two Sides of Being: A Reassessment of Psycho-Physical Dualism, Paderborn: Mentis, 85–106.

4)          Hirsch E. (2010), Kripke’s Argument Against Materialism, [in:] R.C. Koons, G. Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 115136.

5)          Jackson F. (1982), Epiphenomenal Qualia, The Philosophical Quarterly 32, 127–136; Jackson F. (1986), What Mary Didn’t Know, The Journal of Philosophy 83, 291–295.

6)          Levine J. (1983), Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64, 354–361.

7)          Chalmers D. (2009), The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism, [in:] B. McLaughlin, A. Bec­kermann, S. Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 313–335.

8)          Swinburne R. (2007), From Mental/Physical Identity to Substance Dualisrn, [in:] P. van Inwagen, D. Zimmerman (eds.), Persons: Hurnan and Divine, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 142–165.

9)          Lowe E.J. (2010), Substance Dualism: A Non-Cartesian Approach, [in:] R.C. Koons, G. Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Mate­rialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–23; Lowe E.J. (2008), A Defence of Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism, [in:] A. Antonietti, A. Corradini, E.J. Lowe (eds.), Psycho-Physical Dualism Today. An Interdisciplinary Approach, Lanham: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefied, 167–183.

10)     BonJour L. (2010), Against Materialism, [in:] R. C. Koons, G. Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Mate­rialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3–23.

11)     Meixner U. (2014), Against Physicalism, [in:] A. Lavazza, H. Robinson (eds.), Contemporary Dualism. A Defense, London: Routledge, 17–34.

12)     Plantinga A. (2006), Against Materialism, Faith and Philosophy 23(1), 3–32.

13)     Gibb S.C. (2015), Defending Dualism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115, 131−146.

14)     Lycan W. (2009), Giving Dualism its Due, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87, 551–563; Lycan W. (2018), Redressing Substance Dualism, [in:] J.J. Loose, A.J.L. Menuge, J.P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism, Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 22–39.

15)     Grygianiec M. (2016), Die popperschen Herausforderungen für den Materialismus, Logos i Ethos (2), 71–81.

 

Literatura rezerwowa:

 

16)     Nida-Rümelin M. (2010), An Argument from Transtemporal Identity for Subject-Body Dualism, [in:] R.C. Koons, G. Bealer(eds.), The Waning of Materialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 190–211.

17)     Popper K.R., Eccles  J. (1985), The Self and Its Brain, New York: Springer Verlag.

18)     Popper K.R. (1953), Language and the Body-Mind Problem. A Restatement of Interactionism, Proceedings of the 11th International Congress of Philosophy 7, 101−107.

19)     Lowe E. J. (2014), Why my Body Is Not Me: the Unity Argument for Emergentist Self-Body Dualism, [in:] A. Lavazza, H. Robinson (eds.), Contemporary dualism: A defense, New York: Routledge, 245–266.

20)     Chalmers D. (2009),  Świadomość i jej miejsce w naturze, tłum T. Ciecierski, R. Poczobut, [w:] M. Miłkowski, R. Poczobut (red.), Analityczna metafizyka umysłu. Najnowsze kontrowersje, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Instytutu Filozofii i Socjologii Polskiej Akademii Nauk.

21)     Zimmerman D.W. (2010), From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84, 119–150.

22)     Gertler B. (2008), In Defence of Mind-Body Dualism, [in:] J. Feinberg, R. Shafer-Landau (eds.), Reason and Responsibility: Readings in Some Basic Problems of Philosophy, 13th ed., Belmont: Thomson Wadswort, 285–297.

23)     Madell  G. (2010), The  Road  to  Substance  Dualism, Royal  Institute  of Philosophy  Supplements 67, 45–60.

24)     BonJour L. (2013), What Is It Like to be a Human (Instead of a Bat)?, American Philosophical Quarterly 50(4), 373–385.