Analizy metafizyczne: trwanie i Tożsamość osobowa

(Metaphysical Analyses: Persistence and Personal Identity)

Seminarium w roku akad. 2017/2018

 

Literatura podstawowa:

 

1.          Hershenov D.B. (2012), Personal Identity, [in:] The Continuum Companion to Metaphysics, N.A. Manson, R.W. Barnard (eds), London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 198–222.

2.          Shoemaker S. (1998), Personal Identity: A Materialist's Account, [in:] Metaphysics: The Big Questions, P. van Inwagen, D.W. Zimmerman (eds.), Malden: Blackwell, 296–310.

3.          Lewis D. (2006), Przetrwanie a tożsamość, [w:] Filozofia podmiotu. Fragmenty filozofii analitycznej, t. VIII, J. Górnicka-Kalinowska (red.), Warszawa: Aletheia, 169–194.

4.          Madden R. (2016), Human Persistence, Philosophers' Imprint 16(17), s. 1–18.

5.          Swinburne R. (1998), Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory, [in:] Metaphysics: The Big Questions, P. van Inwagen, D.W. Zimmerman (eds.), Malden: Blackwell, 317–333.

6.          Lowe E.J. (2009), Serious Endurantism and the Strong Unity of Human Persons, [in:] Unity and Time in Metaphysics, L. Honnefelder, E. Runggaldier, B. Schick (eds.), Berlin – New York: Walter de Gruyter, 6782.

7.          Baker L.R. (2013), Is the Idea of the First-Person Perspective Coherent?, [in:] L.R. Baker, Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective, New York: Oxford University Press, 144160.

8.          Toner P. (2011), On Hylemorphism and Personal Identity, European Journal of Philosophy 19(3), 454–473.

9.          Duncan M. (2015), I Think, Therefore I Persist, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93(4), 740756.

10.      Pruss A.R. (2012), A Deflationary Theory of Diachronic Identity, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90(1), 19–37.

11.      Kind A. (2004), The Metaphysics of Personal Identity and Our Special Concern for the Future, Metaphilosophy 35(4), 536553.

12.      Hawley K. (2014), Persistence and Time, [in:] The Cambridge Companion to Life and Death, S. Luper (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 47–63.

13.      DeGrazia D. (2014), The Nature of Human Death, [in:] The Cambridge Companion to Life and Death, S. Luper (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 80–100.

14.      Baker L.R. (2005), Death and the Afterlife, [in:] The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion, W. Wainwright (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 366–391.

15.      Francescotti R. (2017), Surviving Death: How To Refute Termination Theses, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 1–20 (forthcoming).

 

Literatura rezerwowa:

 

1.           Chisholm R.M. (1998), Identity through Time, [in:] R.M. Chisholm, Person and Object. A Metaphysical Study, La Salle: Open Court Publishing Company, 89113; Chisholm R.M. (1986), Self-Profile, [in:] Roderick M. Chisholm, R. J. Bogdan (ed.), Dordrecht: Reidel, 65–77.

2.           Zimmerman D.W. (2013), Personal Identity and the Survival of Death, [in:] The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death, B. Bradley, F. Feldman, J. Johansson (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 97–153.

3.           Shoemaker D. (2007), Personal Identity and Practical Concerns, Mind 116, 317–357.

4.           Parfit D. (2012), We Are Not Human Beings, Philosophy 87(1), 528.

5.           Swinburne R.G. (2006), Identyczność osoby, [w:] Filozofia podmiotu. Fragmenty filozofii analitycznej, t. VIII, J. Górnicka-Kalinowska (red.), Warszawa: Aletheia, 329–345.

6.           Merricks T. (1998), There Are No Criteria of Identity Over Time, Noűs 32, 106–124.

7.           Nozick R. (2003), Personal Identity Through Time, [in:] Personal Identity, R. Martin, J. Barresi (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, 92–114.

8.           Baker L.R. (2009), Identity Across Time: A Defense of Three-Dimensionalism, [in:] Unity and Time in Metaphysics, L. Honnefelder, E. Runggaldier, B. Schick (eds.), Berlin – New York: Walter de Gruyter, 114.

9.           van Inwagen P. (1997), Materialism and the Psychological-Continuity Account of Personal Identity, Philosophical Perspectives 11, 305–319.

10.      Noonan H. (2003), Personal Identity, London: Routledge, 2462 (ch. 2 and 3).

11.      Williams B. (2003), The Self and the Future, [in:] Personal Identity, R. Martin, J. Barresi (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, 75–91.

12.      Noonan H.W., Curtis B. (2015), Identity over Time, Constitution and the Problem of Personal Identity, [in:] The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness, S.M. Miller (ed.), Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamin’s Publishing Co., 348371.

13.      Iwanicki M. (2011), Identyczność osobowa. Wybrane stanowiska i argumenty, [w:] Przewodnik po metafizyce, S. T. Kołodziejczyk (red.), Kraków: WAM, 277–314.